NTSB Witness

NTSB Witness.gov

Witness.gov is an email address to send messages to the National Transportation Safety Board on their investigations. I wrote to them on August 9, 2024 about the Special Investigation Report SIR-08/01 and about the accident on Mokuleia, Hawaii on June 21, 2019.

My experience at Skydive Chesapeake is quite like the operation in Hawaii, however the behavior of the United States Parachute Association should be of note to NTSB. In their response to the SIR Report of 2008 the USPA told them, in 2011, that Aircraft Operations Manuals and Pilot Training Syllabus had been written. I recently found out that the USPA has done nothing to see that those are used.

Less the illustrations, the following was sent to NTSB:

I.Avid Skydiver

I have been an avid skydiver, off and on, since 1975. I am a D License holder with the United States Parachute Association. In 2020 I helped the managers of Skydive Delmarva in Laurel, Delaware move too Gooden Airpark in Ridgely, Maryland. The owner, John Gooden went to high school with my son.

I decided to get my instructors rating with that new drop zone, Skydive Chesapeake. It was managed by Ben Harris and Chris Derbak.

II. Safety Issues at Skydive Chesapeake

A. Lost Control of Piper Navaho

Unsafe activities occurred there after it opened in 2020. On December 11, 2020, they leased a Piper PA31-310 Navajo (N6719L). The pilot was not trained on it and on the first jump he lost control of the airplane. He immediately regained control but it was disturbing.

First Group of Skydivers to Jump From Skydive Chesapeake's Navajo

B. Violation of Seat Belts regulations, FAR § 91.107

They operated that airplane in 2021 and flew it repeatedly without enough seat belts for each jumper. On February 25, 2021, a video depicts this. Derbak was one of the people who made that jump. He is sitting in the copilot’s chair!

Shortly after that I was on that plane when another skydiver, who has considerable experience as a jump pilot, warned him (the same one who last control in February) that if he was flying with one engine out, with an overloaded plane that he would have a distinct problem. The pilot was scared. As I said, he didn't have training and I didn’t have a seat belt.

That weekend, I wrote to both operators of the drop zone to inform them of the pilot and all the other questionable activities.

III. Kicked Out of Skydive Chesapeake

A. No USPA support

One week later I was suspended from the drop zone. At the meeting when I was suspended from the drop zone, I was told by Harris that Ron Bell, the USPA Safety Director, had been given my letter. My perspective on it couldn’t have come from Harris, so I wrote to Mr. Bell to explain it.

Bell was sick with Covid 19, so my letter was sent to the Eastern Region Director, Shauna Finley. Harris never did send my letter to Bell. Finley and Bell knew what happened with the FAR violations and the other items but never did anything about it. This was a few months after Harris signed a Group Membership pledge to honor FAR Regulations.

My suspension lasted a month. When Harris knew that the USPA was informed he permanently banned me from the drop zone.

IV. Special Investigation Report SIR-08/01

What’s happening at Skydive Chesapeake is exactly what happened on Mokuleia, Hawaii on June 21, 2019. That pilot was untrained. That aircraft was not airworthy for its mission.

In their report by the NTSB in 2008, there were 12 Recommendations. Many of them had to do with aircraft maintenance guidance packets and pilot training. In 2011, the USPA, in response to the Report, wrote a Flight Operations Handbook template and Jump Pilot Training Syllabus template for drop zones to use to make their operations safer. However, the USPA never did anything to make those templates effective.

I know this because, in February of 2024 I wrote to the current USPA Eastern Region Director, Dave Grabowski, of what drop zones in his region have aircraft operations manuals and new and current pilot training, according to the USPA 2011 templates. After thirteen years it isn’t known by the USPA if any drop zones are using them. Grabowski’s answer to my question was that those documents are “private information”. He and the USPA have no knowledge who has those items and who is using them.

According to what happened to the Oahu Parachute Center in 2019 and what I know of Skydive Chesapeake, neither of those drop zones are using them. Both have had deaths.

V. DZdeviance.org

I decided to write a blog. It’s at DZDeviance.org. The name derives from what happened on the January 1986 accident of the Space Shuttle Challenger. NASA deviated from safety and the USPA and their drop zones are doing it as well.

However, its worse for the USPA. They never actually had safety methods to be deviated from. Templates were written by the USPA in 2011, but they aren’t used today. In their final report in 2008 the NTSB was satisfied, but those templates aren’t used. If they were, and if they were part of Safety Management System plan, the USPA and every jumper would know about it.

Jim Couch wrote an article in the USPA’s magazine in 2020. It highlights a crash in 1995 that is an exact example of “Normalization of Deviance” as NASA identifies it. A pilot, ten skydivers and a person on the ground were killed in that September 10, 1995, accident.

VI. Other Noncompliance

A. Advisory Circular AC 105-2E

In 1998 an Evaluation of Improved Restraint Systems for Sport Parachutes by the FAA Civil Aeromedical Institute and the Parachute Industries Association was produced. It has been in the Advisory Circular since 2011. The USPA has never done anything to implement this on any drop zone.

The Sullivan, Missouri Crash Report on July 29, 2006 and the Crash Injury report illustrates how bad restraints kill people and make them quad and paraplegics. The analyses showed that the peak deceleration on that flight was between 6.6 G and 19.7 G’s. These ranges fall within survivable limits according to the report but not from a single point and suspended like a fish on a hook. That’s what most parachutists have during such a crash.

Sullivan MI report figures 4 and 5 — Figures 4 and 5 from July 29 2006 Sullivan Missouri accident report

B. No SMS, Safety Management System

The USPA has a page on their web site that discusses Safety Management System. In my blog I proposed a safety plan to solve this. It’s in the article in DZDeviance.org, Proposal for Reform.

I went to the USPA Board Meeting where I proposed that plan. Michael Wadkins, Chair of the Safety Committee, asked me what USPA documents I would change if that were to happen. I did that in August of 2022 and received no response.

USPA has said that a SMS plan should be in drop zones, but they have done nothing to do that. It’s the same with Aircraft Operations Plan’s, restraint systems and pilot training.

VII. Safety and Training Advisors, S&TA’s

USPA has a S&TA at every drop zone and they are usually paid by the owner. At Skydive Chesapeake there are two S&TA’s, the first jump instructor and Harris. Both receive most of their income from the drop zone. There are extreme conflicts of interest there.

VIII. USPA Directors Come and Go

The person who responded to the NTSB’s Special Investigation Report SIR-08/01 in 2008 isn’t the current director. The directors who were there at that time put together an operations plan and something that could serve to verify pilot’s training. All they are now, is templates and no one at the USPA is interested in solving the problems in the 2008 report. If the NTSB or the FAA or Congress expects anything to happen for restraints, aircraft operations or pilot training, or a SMS program, it won’t have the USPA, as it currently exists to do anything about it

IX. Laura Olson’s Death

It’s only been four years and Skydive Chesapeake has already had a death. The person only had three jumps, and she was supervised on that jump, and trained, by one of those S&TA’s. I wasn’t there, but I’m sure that what happened to her is partially an aspect of the safety culture there, which doesn’t exist. I’m also sure that if the USPA had more to with the drop zones and an actual SMS plans, the NTSB would be satisfied.

NTSB Witness Read More »

Skydive Chesapeake Is Deviant. The USPA Is Much Worse.

Skydive Chesapeake Is Deviant. The USPA Is Much Worse.

I began this blog referring to a phrase called “Normalization of Deviance”. That was a phrase that was NASA's flaw in the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. This graphic illustrates it:

When I was jumping there, Skydive Chesapeake has many examples of this deviant behavior. They’ve gone through many “normal”, with untrained pilots, bad spotting, seat belt violations and others. The article that I originally sighted was from USPA Training Advisor, Jim Crouch, and it talked about an incident in 1995 when 12 people were killed. Their Queen Air lost power and crashed and the NTSB found many examples of the kinds of things that are Normalization of Deviance. They’ve been found in many skydiving accidents involving aircraft.

The United States Parachute Association isn't deviant. Their behavior has never wavered from what is normal.

On February 1st, 2024 I emailed Dave Grabowski, the Eastern Region USPA Director, with this request. “I’m interested in all drop zones in the Eastern Region that have current Flight Operations Handbooks and USPA Aircraft Status Forms. Please provide those to me. Thank you.”

Dave’s response verified what I knew. He said, “I don't have the info you are looking for, and even if I did, it's not my or USPA's place to provide what are essentially private business documents to a third party.”

Sixteen years before my communication with Grabowski, the National Transportation Safety Board issued a report, Special Investigation Report SIR-08/01 . It listed skydiving deaths as a result of aircraft crashes. It said that, “Since 1980, 32 accidents involving parachute operations aircraft have killed 172 people, most of whom were parachutists.”

The USPA responded to the report and said that they would put together a document about aircraft safety operations. They also had a document of pilot safety training. The Special Investigation was an NTSB product but the FAA responded by saying, in 2011, that “Your manual will help parachutists perform more safely.”

The USPA's response in 2011 didn’t have the effect that the NTSB sought on Skydive Chesapeake or to the Oahu Parachute Center. On June 21, 2019 a King Air crashed there killing 11 people. That is reported on in Oahu Parachute Center accident investigation. Three of them were not skydivers, just tourists seeking tandem jumps.

Bryan and Ashley Weikel on their 1^stanniversary (KKTV News11 (Colorada Springs, CO)

What happened on June 21, 2019 at Dillingham Airfield (HDH), Mokuleia, Hawaii was exactly like what the NTSB reported on in 2008. Jim Crouch warned about and its occuring at Skydive Chesapeake and other drop zones today.

The FAA said that the USPA's Operation's Manual and it Pilot Training Guidance would enhance skydiving safety but that assumes that those documents would be used. It is not. The USPA has no knowledge of any drop zone using them. According to Gabowski those are, "private business documents".

In their report, the NTSB said the Oahu Parachute Center operator had 18,000 tandem jumps but, “no previous experience running a parachute operation.” He also didn’t have the integrity to operate a safe drop zone. I mentioned this at Safety Day in 2024. Ben Harris, Skydive Chesapeake's operator, does not have the integrity to operate a Safety Culture. That got me physically removed from the event.

Many people who were at the event that day know what Harris did me. It's in my original post , "Deviance at Skydive Chesapeake". His character counters safety.

The NTSB Report from Hawaii stated that the OPC did not have a training curriculum or company training manuals for OPC pilots. A former OPC pilot, who was not a flight instructor but provided training to multiple OPC pilots (not including the accident pilot), stated that the company did not provide him with direction for training except to teach new pilots to start the engines, taxi, take off, fly the jump run, and land the airplane, after which the pilots would be “good to go.” The former pilot also stated that “there was no money to take the airplane off the line” for training and that training consisted of “a couple of jump runs.” The former pilot further stated that most of the company’s training involved viewing King Air Academy videos on YouTube instead of hands-on training.

Another former OPC pilot stated that the company’s King Air training “was a joke.” This former pilot also stated that his training on the airplane was “minimal” and that his instructor advised, at the completion of training, “not to get uncoordinated.”

The airplane was not airworthy. The pilot was not trained. No aircraft operational assignment existed.

I was banned from jumping at Skydive Chesapeake after citing safety violations. They included not having enough seat belts in the Piper Navajo, N6719L. (This is a violation of CFR § 91.107) Welding going on in the packing area, no ground Support Personnel at boarding and poor pilot training, among others.

The 2008 NTSB Report was repeatedly cited in the Report of what happened at Oahu. Many of the things that happened between 1980 and 2008 were repeated at the field in Hawaii. The operational plans and the pilot training mission that the USPA specified after 2008 did nothing at Hawaii and nothing at Skydive Chesapeake.

When they published their report, the NTSB thought the USPA would do something, and they did. They published a template, the “Skydiving Aircraft OPERATIONS MANUAL”. In 2011 the FAA said it will positively effect how, “parachutists perform more safely”. According to Grabowski, there is no info on who in the Eastern Region has an operational plan or who is training their pilots. They don’t want fellow skydivers to have these documents because, “it's not my or USPA's place to provide what are essentially private business documents to a third party.”

Why is that true? The current USPA “Group Membership Manual” asks if there is Skydiving Aircraft OPERATIONS MANUAL for the drop zone, but according to Grabowski, he doesn’t know which drop zone’s have it. It also asks if there is an initial and recurrent training for jump pilots at the drop zone? According to Grabowski that’s private information and not available. He doesn’t know it. If there was an Operations Manual, and it was followed, what happened in Hawaii wouldn’t have happened. Bryan and Ashley would be alive.

Many of the things that happened in Mokuleia, Hawaii are present at Gooden Field in Ridgely, MD, (Skydive Chesapeake). I attended Skydive Chesapeake’s Safety Day on March 23, 2024 and was told by the Drop Zone owner that he does have a Operation’s Manual, because of insurance requirements. It’s not available to any of his customer’s. Why is that? If he had a safety plan his customer’s should know about it. Maybe he has first time and recurrent pilot training. That would be another aspect of his operation that his customers should know.

In my original posts from 2021, Deviance at Skydive Chesapeake and Much is Awry in Ridgely it can be seen how far that drop zone is from where it should be.

In that original post I referred to a welding operation in the packing area. That was quite bizarre. There wasn’t a lease so the owner could do whatever he wanted.

Not having enough seat belts in Navajo, N6719L happened repeatedly. Loadmasters and jumpmasters don’t exist then and they probably still don’t exist now and it’s because the Safety and Training Advisor (S&TA) is the drop zone owner!

The USPA accepts this despite saying that operating without enough seat belts is breaking the law. Evidence of this is at Ten Jumpers in an airplane configured for eight. Ron Bell, USPAs Director of Safety and Training went to Skydive Chesapeake a week after I was suspended from the drop zone in March of 2020. He was told about the lack of seat belts and he should have established that it happened. There was nothing done about it.

Operations Manuals are “private information” according to the USPA. Nobody knows if any drop zone Operations are acceptable. The kind of training done for pilots at the Oahu Parachute Center was nothing, and this was many years after the USPA wrote Operations Manuals for their drop zones.

This isn't the only thing where USPA has done nothing. The Federal Aviation Administration’s Civil Aeromedical Institute, the Parachute Industries Association, and the USPA has known, since 1998, that restraint systems for parachutists are inadequate. Read the Sullivan, Missouri Crash Report and for those with strong stomachs, the Sullivan, Missouri Injury Report will shock you. Since 2011 Advisory Circular 105-2D clearly stated how to make it safer. I don’t think that any drop zone in the world has done it.

Furthermore, the USPA has established that Safety Management System (SMS) should be at drop zones. Nothing is happening about this either.

I made a proposal to the USPA in their board meeting in 2022. It recommended a safety proposal for drop zones with a Safety Committee just like in the SMS system. That’s in my post Proposal for Reform. The plan that I proposed would not put anyone on that board that receives an income from the drop zone. The safety personnel at the Oahu Parachute Center, if there was one, was the drop zone owner, just like Skydive Chesapeake.

My proposal calls for two types of Group Memberships. One type does have members on the committee who receive income from the drop zone. Skydive Chicago would be potentially a “Legacy Group Member”. They would provide most or all of the functions and services called for in USPA’s Skydiving Aircraft Operations Manual and the drop zone’s Flight Operations Handbook with paid staff members. The other type would be “Safety Committee Group Member”. They have qualified volunteers who form drop zone Safety Committee to provide some of the functions and services called for. In those drop zones the Committee’s do not receive income.

Skydive Chesapeake and the Oahu Parachute Center would be Safety Committee Members. Of course, no drop zone would have to be either. They could choose just not to have an SMS system. I wouldn’t want to jump at a drop with no safety system.

That’s another thing I’ve heard from Graboski and other USPA directors. USPA “C” and “D” license holders don’t want to get involved in dealing with safety on their drop zones. Maybe that is true but what about the others? Bryan and Ashley Weikel would have wanted to know. Every drop zone should tell their customers their safety system. They should admit to that and have the credentials to prove it. If they don’t, they should admit to that to. That is where the USPA should get involved. The USPA’s Skydiving Aircraft Operations Manual and the drop zone’s Flight Operations Handbook should be open to the public.

On July 10, 2022 Laura Olson was killed in a skydive at Skydive Chesapeake. She had three jumps. An Incident Report says the accident was recorded in August of 2023. That too is little weird being thirteen months after the event. The incident says that the weather was good with a five mile-an-hour wind and that Olson landed in trees and fell out of them. The fall from the trees caused a fatal injury.

I was kicked out of the drop zone just before Safety Day on 2020 because I brought safety issues up. At that time a lot of the jumpers were landing off the drop zone for bad spots. I made a map with all roads identified so that my wife and I could retrieve jumpers that landed outside the drop zone. It happened nearly every day.

In that map, it can be seen that there are no trees, except in the east and southeast. Olson’s jump was in a 5 mph wind so the spot was close to the landing area. If the wind wasn’t out of the east or southeast there were no trees over the spot. The spot might have been bad, and if so, that is why she landed in trees.

Because of the bad spots and because the pilots aren’t trained that should be looked at. They were jumping a Caravan at 13,500 feet. Did other jumpers know the spot was wrong? If it was wrong, that should be called to attention. Both S&TA’s at Skydive Chesapeake make all their money from the drop zone and it isn’t too much. The drop zone owner is one of the S&TAs at the drop zone. The other S&TA was Mrs. Olson instructor on that skydive.

I think the USPA and drop zones run like Skydive Chesapeake and the Oahu Parachute Center are doomed. The NTSB and Congress have their reports. Poor newlyweds are killed. If the drop zones don’t take the steps, like valid SMS System, and if skydivers don’t make it happen, our sport won’t survive, unless you want to go to The Mid-East.

The fault there is with the USPA. Drop zone owners have very conflicted interests. The Oahu Parachute Center was sealed from the start. The practices that owner undertook were awful. A viable SMS system is called for where somebody outside profit is needed. The current USPA system does not have it.

Skydive Chesapeake Is Deviant. The USPA Is Much Worse. Read More »

Much is Awry in Ridgely

2 Comments / Offenders, Offending Drop Zones / Rob Crimmins

Chapter 2

The Whistle is Unintentionally Blown

So why, after all my support, would all these charges suddenly be brought against me? The answer is, Normalization of Deviation has been established at Skydive Chesapeake and I, “had overstepped a divide between operational matters and community involvement”, by privately pointing it out.

March 20th, 2021

The jump on February 25th wasn’t the only one that included more jumpers than seat belts and people climbing out of pilot seats. My second jump on Saturday, March 20th, my last at Skydive Chesapeake, also included those elements.

pilot and skydiving instructor at Skydive Chesapeake taking a risk — Pilot and Skydiving Instructor at Skydive Chesapeake Deviating from Normal

Both jumps that day were to practice AFF exits. The first one was with three instructors and two videographers.

(A link to that video is here and it includes graphics and countdowns intended to illustrate jump run distances over the ground and times to exit for our group and the one before. Those features in the video were to help the pilot and jumpers realize just why so many jumpers were landing off the field, which happened more than once on many of the days I was there. Once, the whole load landed quite far from the field, after dark. My wife and I were one of several rescue parties. I had to knock on a neighbor’s door for permission to drive on his farm. He offered to help and was kind enough to let us use his truck.)

My group on the second jump that day was me and a very experienced jumper, one with well over 10,000 jumps. This time, the skydiver in the co-pilot's seat was Joe Manlove, the drop zone’s 1st jump course instructor. We had to go around for a second jump run because the pilot overshot the spot. At one point during the go-around I happened to be looking forward as Joe struggled to get out of his seat.

Since I was the second jumper to board, I sat on the starboard side all the way forward with my back to the co-pilot seat. Five jumpers were on my side of the aircraft which only had four seat belts. I tried to share my belt with the 10k jump guy but it was not long enough to do so. Turning to my right gave me an unobstructed view of the pilot as he waited for the others to board. The jumper with whom I was unable to share a belt, is a commercial pilot with a multi-engine rating and thousands of PIC hours flying jumpers. Like me, he was far enough forward to be able to speak to the pilot.

After getting settled he turned to the pilot and said, “You know, you’ll have your hands full with an engine-out.”

The young pilot, a Russian named Alex, looked to him with worry, if not fear in his eyes, and said, “Tell me about it.”

His expression did not convey confidence. Looking into his eyes I recalled another incident with him that chilled me.

Loss of Control

On December 11, 2020, during the first load at the drop zone for the Piper PA31-310 Navajo (N6719L), Alex lost control of the airplane. The ride to altitude that day was erratic. We didn’t climb out aggressively but rather seemed to float at times and bank and pitch excessively. The motion made me airsick. I didn’t vomit but I was on the edge.

On jump run when Alex lit the light telling the jumper in the back to open the door, he couldn’t. The cord used to release the door to close it had been mis-routed. Alex took both hands off the yoke to try to clear the cord and lost control of the airplane. Derbak shouted in a loud and very urgent tone, “Fly the f__king airplane!!” Control was quickly regained but not before we pitched sharply and banked enough to make all who weren't seated have to brace. I fell against the port side of the plane.

Eventually someone in the back was able to clear the cord and open the door. I’ve never been more happy to leave an airplane. The others felt the same. One of them, a friend from the old days who had just completed a recurrency jump with me, hasn’t been back because of what happened.

The current FAA Advisory Circular for Sport Parachuting, 105-2E, was issued after the NTSB published a landmark report in 2008. That report, NTSB/SIR-08/01, looked at a number of causes for fatal aircraft accidents, one being pilot proficiency. The AC called for pilot training and review of procedures, including exits, before flying with customers. It didn’t seem like Alex, or anyone else at the drop zone, was aware of the Advisory Circular or the landmark report.

The Ill Fated outline

With that event in mind as we taxied to the runway on March 20th I considered the facts and a few frightening possibilities. First was the possibility that we were overloaded and in the hands of a sketchy pilot. Then I thought of how far I was from the door, engine failures are quite possible in old airplanes with piston engines and a number of other questionable practices that had become pretty standard in the previous few months. I decided then to do something else to improve matters and the next day I made an outline. It included fifteen items. Some are non-urgent equipment or operational improvements. Others were significant safety issues. As it turned out at least one is a Federal violation.

Since my assistance had been very freely accepted up until then, on literally dozens of matters, I assumed it would be welcomed on matters concerning safety. The last paragraph of the outline, which was four pages, read, “Since the drop zone is new, some procedures and habits are yet to be established. It’s understandable that conditions that are less than ideal may linger. Some that remain can lead to worse consequences than others. By pointing them out, even minor ones, I hope to help the drop zone succeed and thrive.

The First Reprisals, Suspension and False Accusations

That outline, which was sent to Ben Harris on March 23rd, was the action that brought on the viscous attacks on my character and the suspension. The letter of suspension said it was about “misconduct involving verbal altercations on March 20” but the actual reason really couldn’t be more obvious. I had challenged Harris and Derbak on important matters and they took offense. The suspension was clearly a reprisal for citing safety issues and offending their pride.

Harris wrote back on the 24th simply saying, “I shared this with John and Troy. Thanks for the input we’ll talk more this weekend if you are around.” Thanking me led me to believe that he was accepting my input as intended. His thanks was a ruse.

To my knowledge our Safety and Training Advisor, John Williams, had not been to the drop zone since it opened but for protocol I sent the outline to him too. Williams’ absence was one of the items in my list.

The following Saturday, March 27, as my wife and I prepared to enjoy a Saturday at the drop zone with friends, Harris asked me to follow him into a storage room. Derbak was there with another jumper who is listed with the USPA as an S&TA along with Williams. He told my wife the week before that he was no such thing, and he was emphatic about it. That’s why I didn’t send the outline to him.

Harris was cold and angry. Derbak was furious. Harris paged through the outline in less than a minute. He said none of the points were valid. Putting it aside he then told me that I was suspended from the property for thirty days and my ratings would never be used there. He explained that the incidents that involved confronting staff members were about what happened the previous week when he wasn’t there. Despite that, he didn’t want to hear my side of that story.

Of course, this was grossly unfair, but then he brought up the other revelations about the customers, students and sexual assaults. Derbak nodded and supported Harris throughout the brief meeting. Lastly, Harris proclaimed that he had sent my outline to the USPA. If they had a problem with what I had brought up they would let him know.

Banishment

On April 30, before returning from the suspension, I sent an email to Harris, Derbek, Manlove and Max Sivohins, the drop zone’s third partner, asking for clarification of the probation process and asking for a meeting and reconciliation. Harris called within hours to tell me that I was permanently banned from the drop zone. His stated reason was that I had informed the USPA and the FAA about unsafe practices.

I blew the whistle. Whether or not it should have been blown had nothing to do with it.

On May 7th I sent an email to the drop zone and copied Ron Bell, USPA’s Director of Safety and Training and Shauna Finley, their Eastern Region Director. Unlike the suspension, the reason for this action was not put in writing, which isn't surprising. Harris couldn't say before witnesses the real reason for his actions, much less make a record of them. Bell and Finley knew what was going on yet neither intervened.

From the step on Skydive Chesapeake's C-182

Few have asked about what happened or why I haven’t been around. Naturally that’s disappointing but since my reputation is an important concern, regardless of friendships, I’m compelled to tell my side of the story. Ethics and safety are important too and those subjects are also part of this. The “divide” Harris alluded to, not the confrontation or sexual assaults, or anything else, is the reason for the suspension and the permanent ban.

Summarizing Some of What's Awry in Ridgely

The sort of operation that Ben Harris and Chris Derbak manage requires such a division. Without it, violating regulations has consequences because operational and moral deviance can be scrutinized. In his letter of suspension Harris wrote, “Our unique industry requires a certain degree of separation between operational matters and community involvement.” It’s his unique operation that requires such separation, not our industry. All industries maintain some separation from their communities, but skydiving is special for the opposite reason. To be safe, skydiving operations require diligent, constant customer involvement.

Jumpers are responsible for their own safety and their actions can affect others; in the plane, in freefall and on the ground. Skydiving operations should be very much a part of every jumper’s business and operators should promote a safety culture where “community involvement” is welcome. Such an environment doesn’t exist at Skydive Chesapeake.

Much is Awry in Ridgely Read More »

Deviance at Skydive Chesapeake

2 Comments / Offending Drop Zones / Rob Crimmins

Foreword & Chapter 1

Normalization of Deviance at NASA

“Normalization of Deviance” is a phrase coined by a sociologist in her analysis of the Space Shuttle Challenger accident. I was at Port Canaveral that day and I was on the Cape the day after helping to investigate another failure. Ours took place on the Air Force Station hours after the tragedy and it was related to it. After that magnificent machine and the souls aboard it fell from a brilliant Florida sky all of us who lived on the Space Coast were in shock.

In the Shuttle Program waivers and deviations became normal. That day and the lessons from it still affect me.

At Skydive West Point in 1995

A compelling article in the September 2020 issue of Parachutist cites Normalization of Deviance as a contributing factor in a crash in 1995 that took the lives of ten skydivers and two others. The scene pictured here was in late February, 2021 during jump run on my last jump of the day at Skydive Chesapeake in Ridgely, Maryland. The same number of skydivers are aboard the aircraft in this image as were on the Queen Air in 1995. Another element from this scene that both events have in common is that both include skydiving operations that deviated from normal. One similarity that the recent event doesn’t share with the one in 1995 is that the deviation from safe operation that occurred at Skydive Chesapeake in 2021 was completely intentional.

Chris Derbak in skydiving gear and seated in co-pilot's position — Chris Derbak in Co-pilot's Seat in an aircraft with fewer seat belts than occupants. (Click for the video of the scene.)

At Skydive Chesapeake in 2021

Here, Chris Derbak, one of Skydive Chesapeake’s co-owners is engaged in behavior that clearly deviates from normal. The aircraft is a Piper PA31-310 Navajo (N6719L) and Chris, who is about to jump out behind the others, is in the co-pilot’s seat. He’s not there to help fly the plane. He’s there because if he were in the back with the other jumpers the plane would have tipped, striking the tail on the taxiway as the last jumper boarded.

There are only eight seat belts on the floor behind Chris and the pilot but there were ten jumpers on the load. If Chris was in the back, he and one other skydiver would not have had a seat belt of their own. In that respect he is safer where he is.

On the other hand, Chris is a fairly large fellow who is about to get out of a tight space surrounded by critical controls and important switches. That circumstance is at least slightly dangerous as well. Furthermore, if a heavily loaded twin engine aircraft with anyone other than an expert pilot lost an engine, seat belts might have only made a frantic exit more difficult. Just like NASA and Challenger, deviations from normal (safe) skydiving operations lead to unsafe practices. In this case, several.

My Interest in Establishing the Business

I was really looking forward to a drop zone just 25 minutes from my house in my retirement.

My efforts to establish the drop zone included facilitating the introduction of the Ridgely Airpark owner to Ben Harris, one of three owners and managers of the business. In December of 2019 I made a presentation to the Ridgley, Maryland Town Council about the benefits to the town. Between January and March of 2020 I helped refurbish the building working mostly with Harris and another old-timer, Ben Wong, but often I was alone. The work included planning, demolition, framing, concrete work, window restoration and rebuilding, wiring, installing fixtures, installing and finishing drywall and painting. In the Fall I helped install HVAC system components. It was over 105 man hours. Opening day was a dream come true for me and Harris. Harris invited Ben Wong and me to make the first jump with him. It’s on Youtube at https://studio.youtube.com/video/e18iWp36Zns/editOpening day

Harris asked for invoices so he could submit them with his loan application for proof of his investment. As it turned out, the only commitment or investment those invoices established was mine.

Our Advocacy and Support

My wife and I were advocates and ambassadors and I was a very regular customer. My efforts to make it better continued after the opening by posting numerous Youtube videos of jumpers in freefall, retrieving items of value from Skydive Delmarva prior to it’s demolition, compiling a shot list for the tandem videos, creating a 3D model for a Piper Navajo mock up, and arranging for the procurement of thousands of dollars in lockers.

My wife and I were frequent participants in search parties needed to retrieve jumpers who landed off the field, including one after dark. Off field landings were so frequent, I prepared an aerial image which included all public and private roads, driveways and field access routes that could be used to search for our friends and other customers. (The double white lines on my map are public roads and the single white lines indicate every private driveway and access road within a mile-and-a-half of the airport. We’ve been on every one of them!)

Skydive Chesapeake aid for searchers — Search Party Aid

Betrayal

Our advocacy waned a little as some bad habits and practices became normal but I continued to hope, that in time, it would get better.

So on the last Saturday in March, 2021 when I was told that I was “suspended” for arguing with staff members, offending customers, inappropriate conduct with students and sexual harassment or assault I was completely surprised and for a few hours, utterly devastated.

Harris and Derbak weren’t forthcoming with any details but they did say that the sex offense was based on the harassment or assault of a US Naval Academy Team member.

That would make her, or him, young enough to be my grandchild.

Except for the one about confronting staff members, which was due to yet another bad spot and a bizarre and dangerous incident in the packing loft the week before, all of these so-called offenses are patently false. The sexual charge, if not due to some mistake, yet to be acknowledged, is defamatory, slanderous and utterly despicable. This is the accusation that was intended to do the most damage to my reputation.

None of these misdeeds had been mentioned previously by Harris, Derbak, any customer, any student or any Midshipman. No lawyer, the police, the Naval Academy nor any aggrieved victim, parent, spouse, girlfriend or boyfriend has contacted me about any sexual offense. Of course not. It never happened.

If they happened, all these infringements happened within a ten day period between March 10th and March 20th. I know this because on the tenth Harris posted a notice, asking for anyone interested in attending an AFF course at Skydive Chesapeake. He did so at my request and in my presence because I was working on the rating for use at his drop zone. I was also practicing to be one of his videographers and nearly through with those qualifications.

Facebook post about AFF course at Skydive Chesapeake

It’s possible the allegation of sex crimes is a case of mistaken identity so I contacted the team’s coach. He said no such complaint had been lodged. I also spoke with the team Captain when she and I were at another drop zone a few weeks after the meeting with Harris and Derbak. She too had no knowledge of it. If it were true the Coach and the Captain would have known and neither would have said otherwise. They wouldn’t have given me any details but they wouldn’t have said they knew nothing of it. Their honor and oaths would not have allowed it.

On April 1 Harris offered a formal letter of suspension that cited only one specific reason which was the one about confronting staff members. He wrote, “that I had overstepped a divide between operational matters and community involvement”, but that, “the time and efforts expended on our behalf is deeply appreciated“.

If deep appreciation comes with attempts to ruin a person’s reputation I shudder to think what Derbak and Harris would stoop to if they were ungrateful!

Safety Day 2021 at Skydive Chesapeake was the second Saturday of my suspension. Derbak surprised everyone by abruptly announcing that Skydive Chesapeake’s policy from then on would be zero tolerance for sexual crimes and offenses. I've been "me tooed" by a pair of middle-aged men.

Deviance at Skydive Chesapeake Read More »