whistle blower

portion of group at airplane

Proposal for Reform

USPA Reformation Through:

Continuous Oversight, At No Cost, Through the Use of Highly Qualified Volunteers

Despite having knowledge of the incidents reported in the post, “Much is Awry in Ridgely”, the USPA Regional Director recommended Ben Harris, the owner of Skydive Chesapeake, for the position of S&TA at the drop zone. He got the job. Although every S&TA who derives income from the drop zone has to reconcile his interests as an independent Safety Officer with his role as a revenue and cost conscious employee or contractor, the conflict of interest at Skydive Chesapeake couldn’t be clearer, or more dangerous.

After the 2008 "Special Investigation Report", SIR-08/01, where the NTSB studied 32 fatal crashes, the Board concluded that more needed to be done regarding aircraft airworthiness, piloting, surveillance (by the FAA), and restraints (seat belts).

Regarding surveillance they recommended that the FAA conduct inspections of drop zones. After that the FAA, by Federal Order, did regular inspections but after the accident in Hawaii in June of 2019 where a non-airworthy King Air 65-A90 crashed killing ten skydivers and the pilot the FAA wrote in the Official Correspondence that their inspection wasn’t intended to uncover the deficiencies in that aircraft that contributed to the accident. They wrote that skydivers aren’t passengers and therefor the FAA’s responsibilities regarding passenger safety didn’t apply.

Since the FAA doesn’t regard skydivers as passengers, the only oversight relative to aircraft airworthiness by the USPA for Skydive Chesapeake is a one page form that the owner occasionally submits to them attesting to compliance to one of four Part 91 inspection criteria.

The owner of Skydive Chesapeake broke his Group Membership Pledge very shortly after signing it. The operator at Oahu Parachute Center also lacked the integrity to honor his. Should it be expected either would maintain a true safety culture without help and oversight?

2013 Skydive Delmarva Safety Day
Safety Committee Candidates At Safety Day

A cost free solution would be to enlist USPA members, of which there are 40,000, to provide some of that oversight. What if the USPA encouraged all Group Members to support the formation of safety committees staffed by volunteer USPA members at their drop zones? To qualify, committee members would have to be C or D license holders, pilots, A&Ps, FAA DARs or safety professionals. Another criteria would be that they not derive anything more than incidental income from the drop zone.

Places like Skydive Chicago or Perris have enough revenue to do most, if not all the things that USPA’s Skydiving Aircraft Operations Manual and the drop zone’s Flight Operations Handbook call for with paid staff members. For those drop zones the need for a committee of volunteers is less urgent but it would still have value and their role of oversight could still be vital. For operations like the Oahu Parachute Center or Skydive Chesapeake independent oversight is absolutely critical. Fulfilling specific, day-to-day functions and services at drop zones with revenue problems would allow them to go further toward optimizing procedures and equipment and thereby increasing safety.

New drop zones or ones that serve small markets are less likely to hire Jumpmasters, load masters, boarding escorts, landing monitors and all the other personnel to operate as safely as the manuals would have it. It is undeniable that they are also more likely to cut corners when it comes to safety. (Graphic evidence of that is provided with the picture at the top of this post.)

Group Membership Categorization

To mitigate the cost and alleviate the condition of more roles to fill than individuals to fill them a different organization is in order. What if there were two categories of USPA Group Members? One is a “Legacy” Group Member while the other is a “Committee” Group Member and the drop zone owner would choose the type.

The USPA’s Group Membership Manual would change to add a “Type of Group Membership” section, which would include the terms of the two categories.

Legacy Group Member

Operators who choose this category of Group Membership provide most or all of the functions and services called for in USPA’s Skydiving Aircraft Operations Manual and the drop zone’s Flight Operations Handbook with paid staff members. Functions and services called for in the Aircraft and Flight Operations manuals not carried out by paid personnel may be provided by qualified volunteers who are members of a formally recognized and instituted drop zone Safety Committee according to terms outlined in the following section; “Safety Committee Group Member”.

Safety Committee Group Member

These Group Members use qualified volunteers who are members of a formally recognized and instituted drop zone Safety Committee to provide some of the functions and services called for in USPA’s Skydiving Aircraft Operations Manual and the drop zone’s Flight Operations Handbook.

A True Safety Culture

In this system volunteers provide oversight. The cost to provide the functions and services called for in USPA’s Skydiving Aircraft Operations Manual and the drop zone’s Flight Operations Handbook is mitigated. Consequently, it will be expected and the Group Member Pledge will state, that the Group Member will do his best to provide every function and service called for in both manuals. In such a system, drop zones can be rated. Those who provide most or all of the safety related functions most or all of the time will be rated more highly than those that don't.

This new system calls for USPA members to be actively involved in the safety of every jump. They, in fact, will be elements of a working and ever present Safety Culture.

In a 2008 report titled, “The Safety Culture Indicator Scale Measurement System (SCISMS)”, the FAA states that Safety Culture is, “an enduring value”, common to, “each member of each group in every level of an organization. It refers to the extent to which individuals and groups will commit to personal responsibility for safety; act to preserve, enhance and communicate safety information; strive to actively learn, adapt and modify behavior based on lessons learned from mistakes; and be HELD ACCOUNTABLE OR STRIVE TO BE HONORED in association with these values.

Drop zones are businesses. Currently, USPA license holders are not members of the organization to which the safety culture applies. They are customers. Safety is integral to business operations, not customer relations, so jumpers are NOT honored within the organization for association with the values stated in the definition. Safety Committees would consist of rank and file members of the jumping community whose efforts would be recognized daily and therefor honored.

Terms:

1 Committee Membership
1.1 Open to C & D license holders, pilots, A&Ps, FAA DARs or safety professionals
1.2 Closed to professionals who derive more than incidental income from the drop zone operator.
2 Role of the USPA Safety and Training Advisor
2.1 The S&TA should advise the committee, attend the meetings and review their work but he doesn’t necessarily need to be a member or approve their activities.
3 Terms - Drop zone owners and committee members agree to the following terms.
3.1 Whistle Blower Protection
3.1.1 Suggestions to the Safety Committee can be submitted anonymously and by any customer of the drop zone.
3.1.2 Reprisals against USPA members for identifying valid safety deficiencies are prohibited.
3.1.3 Members of the committee can only be denied the drop zone’s business services for just cause, which needs to be put in writing.
3.2 Owner Protection from "Disgruntled Customers"
3.2.1 The committee must be unanimous in their decision in order for any condition or practice to be deemed unsafe or in need of correction.
3.3 Review of Certain non-financial Business Records (Property Lease)
3.3.1 The benefit of review of certain business records is illustrated by what happened on two consecutive Saturdays in 2021 at Skydive Chesapeake. The drop zone either didn’t have a lease or they had one that allowed others to use their facilities and landing area for purposes other than skydiving that put skydivers in danger. On March 20, 2021 the property owner was allowed to operate a welder in the packing loft while customers and children were present and parachutes were being packed. The following Saturday the owner had an event for which he used the parachute landing area for another aviation activity. The operators couldn't prevent him from displacing the landing area without lease terms that precluded such a disruption. For that day, the landing area, which was originally chosen for it's distance from obstacles was displaced to an adjacent, plowed field separated from the drop zone by power lines. These are examples of the "Normalization of Deviation" that an operation’s safety committee would scrutinize and prevent.
4 Function & Activities
4.1 Forum & voice for anyone’s criticisms, inquiries and suggestions regarding safety
4.2 Safety Audits
A Equipment: Aircraft Per FAR Part 91.409. Mock-ups, fuel stations, other equipment and facilities to standards.
B Personnel: Pilots - Verification that initial pilot training is complete and that testing of experienced pilots has been conducted according to the USPA’s Jump Pilot Training Syllabus. Credential verification
C Personnel: Skydiving Instructors - Verify that all are qualified and current.
D Personnel: Loadmasters, Jumpmasters and Ground Crew members - Verify Loadmasters and Jumpmasters are qualified and that all ground operations functions and services are fully and properly conducted according to the USPA Aircraft Operations Manual and the drop zone’s Flight Operations Handbook
E Procedures - Fueling operations, weight and balance for every flight, checklists, USPA Basic Safety Requirements compliance, aircraft emergency procedures, loadmaster and jump master responsibilities, proper use of restraints per AC 105-2E, gear checks, parachute landing procedures, off-field landings, ground crew procedures, boarding procedures
5 Accident and Incident Reports
5.1 Contribute to and assist in writing accident and incident reports and help to implement recommendations based on lessons learned.
6 Education
6.2 Qualify committee personnel and others to function in safety roles.
7 Oversight of any and all safety matters. Remain continuously vigilant!
There is no implication of which Group Membership category is better. The new or small operation markets themselves as being a product of a safety culture that includes everyone. The established, prosperous drop zones stand on their record and demonstrate their commitment to safety by hiring professionals to fill every requirement. Either way, customers, the FAA, the NTSB, OSHA, parents, wives and everyone else who cares, sees qualified skydivers focused on everyone’s safety.

Whistle Blower Protection

From the points made in previous posts in this blog, particularly those concerning conflicts of interest, it’s clear that when it comes to safety oversight, the current methods are insufficient. The NTSB has learned, and the record indicates, that there are a lot of cracks through which a resource limited, overworked or unscrupulous operator could pass. Currently, if a regular skydiver sees an operator ignoring, or worse, exploiting such a crack he’s on his own. A Safety Committee, operating with the full cooperation of the owner, would give anyone with a concern someone to go to.

The USPA does have a whistle blower policy. It is Appendix B of the Governance Manual. It covers directors, officers, employees and contractors of the Organization, not members.

It is Viable

This is viable. Americans volunteer more than almost any society in the world. Drop zones are quite representative of the country so there won’t be a shortage of people who want to join the committee. Ben Harris, Skydive Chesapeake’s co-owner, wrote that there needs to be a divide between his operation and the community. Every community affected by his operation including skydivers, the drop zone’s neighbors, the town of Ridgely, the aviation community in general and even Harris’ own interests stand to benefit from such a reform.

Proposal for Reform Read More »

Skydive Chesapeake Navajo pilot

Much is Awry in Ridgely

Chapter 2

The Whistle is Unintentionally Blown

So why, after all my support, would all these charges suddenly be brought against me? The answer is, Normalization of Deviation has been established at Skydive Chesapeake and I, “had overstepped a divide between operational matters and community involvement”, by privately pointing it out.

March 20th, 2021

The jump on February 25th wasn’t the only one that included more jumpers than seat belts and people climbing out of pilot seats. My second jump on Saturday, March 20th, my last at Skydive Chesapeake, also included those elements.

pilot and skydiving instructor at Skydive Chesapeake taking a risk
Pilot and Skydiving Instructor at Skydive Chesapeake Deviating from Normal

Both jumps that day were to practice AFF exits. The first one was with three instructors and two videographers.

(A link to that video is here and it includes graphics and countdowns intended to illustrate jump run distances over the ground and times to exit for our group and the one before. Those features in the video were to help the pilot and jumpers realize just why so many jumpers were landing off the field, which happened more than once on many of the days I was there. Once, the whole load landed quite far from the field, after dark. My wife and I were one of several rescue parties. I had to knock on a neighbor’s door for permission to drive on his farm. He offered to help and was kind enough to let us use his truck.)

My group on the second jump that day was me and a very experienced jumper, one with well over 10,000 jumps. This time, the skydiver in the co-pilot's seat was Joe Manlove, the drop zone’s 1st jump course instructor. We had to go around for a second jump run because the pilot overshot the spot. At one point during the go-around I happened to be looking forward as Joe struggled to get out of his seat.

Since I was the second jumper to board, I sat on the starboard side all the way forward with my back to the co-pilot seat. Five jumpers were on my side of the aircraft which only had four seat belts. I tried to share my belt with the 10k jump guy but it was not long enough to do so. Turning to my right gave me an unobstructed view of the pilot as he waited for the others to board. The jumper with whom I was unable to share a belt, is a commercial pilot with a multi-engine rating and thousands of PIC hours flying jumpers. Like me, he was far enough forward to be able to speak to the pilot.

After getting settled he turned to the pilot and said, “You know, you’ll have your hands full with an engine-out.”

The young pilot, a Russian named Alex, looked to him with worry, if not fear in his eyes, and said, “Tell me about it.”

His expression did not convey confidence. Looking into his eyes I recalled another incident with him that chilled me.

Loss of Control

On December 11, 2020, during the first load at the drop zone for the Piper PA31-310 Navajo (N6719L), Alex lost control of the airplane. The ride to altitude that day was erratic. We didn’t climb out aggressively but rather seemed to float at times and bank and pitch excessively. The motion made me airsick. I didn’t vomit but I was on the edge.

On jump run when Alex lit the light telling the jumper in the back to open the door, he couldn’t. The cord used to release the door to close it had been mis-routed. Alex took both hands off the yoke to try to clear the cord and lost control of the airplane. Derbak shouted in a loud and very urgent tone, “Fly the f__king airplane!!” Control was quickly regained but not before we pitched sharply and banked enough to make all who weren't seated have to brace. I fell against the port side of the plane.

First Group of Skydivers to Jump From Skydive Chesapeake's Navajo
First Group of Skydivers to Jump From Skydive Chesapeake's Navajo

Eventually someone in the back was able to clear the cord and open the door. I’ve never been more happy to leave an airplane. The others felt the same. One of them, a friend from the old days who had just completed a recurrency jump with me, hasn’t been back because of what happened.

The current FAA Advisory Circular for Sport Parachuting, 105-2E, was issued after the NTSB published a landmark report in 2008. That report, NTSB/SIR-08/01, looked at a number of causes for fatal aircraft accidents, one being pilot proficiency. The AC called for pilot training and review of procedures, including exits, before flying with customers. It didn’t seem like Alex, or anyone else at the drop zone, was aware of the Advisory Circular or the landmark report.

The Ill Fated outline

With that event in mind as we taxied to the runway on March 20th I considered the facts and a few frightening possibilities. First was the possibility that we were overloaded and in the hands of a sketchy pilot. Then I thought of how far I was from the door, engine failures are quite possible in old airplanes with piston engines and a number of other questionable practices that had become pretty standard in the previous few months. I decided then to do something else to improve matters and the next day I made an outline. It included fifteen items. Some are non-urgent equipment or operational improvements. Others were significant safety issues. As it turned out at least one is a Federal violation.

Since my assistance had been very freely accepted up until then, on literally dozens of matters, I assumed it would be welcomed on matters concerning safety. The last paragraph of the outline, which was four pages, read, “Since the drop zone is new, some procedures and habits are yet to be established. It’s understandable that conditions that are less than ideal may linger. Some that remain can lead to worse consequences than others. By pointing them out, even minor ones, I hope to help the drop zone succeed and thrive.

The First Reprisals, Suspension and False Accusations

That outline, which was sent to Ben Harris on March 23rd, was the action that brought on the viscous attacks on my character and the suspension. The letter of suspension said it was about “misconduct involving verbal altercations on March 20” but the actual reason really couldn’t be more obvious. I had challenged Harris and Derbak on important matters and they took offense. The suspension was clearly a reprisal for citing safety issues and offending their pride.

Harris wrote back on the 24th simply saying, “I shared this with John and Troy. Thanks for the input we’ll talk more this weekend if you are around.” Thanking me led me to believe that he was accepting my input as intended. His thanks was a ruse.

To my knowledge our Safety and Training Advisor, John Williams, had not been to the drop zone since it opened but for protocol I sent the outline to him too. Williams’ absence was one of the items in my list.

The following Saturday, March 27, as my wife and I prepared to enjoy a Saturday at the drop zone with friends, Harris asked me to follow him into a storage room. Derbak was there with another jumper who is listed with the USPA as an S&TA along with Williams. He told my wife the week before that he was no such thing, and he was emphatic about it. That’s why I didn’t send the outline to him.

Harris was cold and angry. Derbak was furious. Harris paged through the outline in less than a minute. He said none of the points were valid. Putting it aside he then told me that I was suspended from the property for thirty days and my ratings would never be used there. He explained that the incidents that involved confronting staff members were about what happened the previous week when he wasn’t there. Despite that, he didn’t want to hear my side of that story.

Of course, this was grossly unfair, but then he brought up the other revelations about the customers, students and sexual assaults. Derbak nodded and supported Harris throughout the brief meeting. Lastly, Harris proclaimed that he had sent my outline to the USPA. If they had a problem with what I had brought up they would let him know.

Banishment

On April 30, before returning from the suspension, I sent an email to Harris, Derbek, Manlove and Max Sivohins, the drop zone’s third partner, asking for clarification of the probation process and asking for a meeting and reconciliation. Harris called within hours to tell me that I was permanently banned from the drop zone. His stated reason was that I had informed the USPA and the FAA about unsafe practices.

I blew the whistle. Whether or not it should have been blown had nothing to do with it.

On May 7th I sent an email to the drop zone and copied Ron Bell, USPA’s Director of Safety and Training and Shauna Finley, their Eastern Region Director. Unlike the suspension, the reason for this action was not put in writing, which isn't surprising. Harris couldn't say before witnesses the real reason for his actions, much less make a record of them. Bell and Finley knew what was going on yet neither intervened.

Skydive Chesapeake's C-182
From the step on Skydive Chesapeake's C-182

Few have asked about what happened or why I haven’t been around. Naturally that’s disappointing but since my reputation is an important concern, regardless of friendships, I’m compelled to tell my side of the story. Ethics and safety are important too and those subjects are also part of this. The “divide” Harris alluded to, not the confrontation or sexual assaults, or anything else, is the reason for the suspension and the permanent ban.

Summarizing Some of What's Awry in Ridgely

The sort of operation that Ben Harris and Chris Derbak manage requires such a division. Without it, violating regulations has consequences because operational and moral deviance can be scrutinized. In his letter of suspension Harris wrote, “Our unique industry requires a certain degree of separation between operational matters and community involvement.” It’s his unique operation that requires such separation, not our industry. All industries maintain some separation from their communities, but skydiving is special for the opposite reason. To be safe, skydiving operations require diligent, constant customer involvement.

Jumpers are responsible for their own safety and their actions can affect others; in the plane, in freefall and on the ground. Skydiving operations should be very much a part of every jumper’s business and operators should promote a safety culture where “community involvement” is welcome. Such an environment doesn’t exist at Skydive Chesapeake.

 

Much is Awry in Ridgely Read More »